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CHAPTER 10 
Products Liability 
JEFFREY D. WITIENBERG* 
§ 10.1. Warranty Protection Not Extended to Bailment Situations. Ma-
son v. General Motors Corporation, 1 casts substantial doubt on the view 
that Massachusetts warranty law provides the necessary quality and 
breadth of legal redress for product related injuries, thus eliminating the 
need to adopt some form of strict liability in tort.2 While the Massachu-
setts legislature has removed many of the traditional impediments3 to 
plaintiffs seeking access to the courts with a breach of warranty claim, 
*JEFFREY D. WITIENBERG is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University School of 
Law. 
§ 10.1. 1 397 Mass. 183, 490 N.E.2d 437 (1986). 
2 Two years after Justice Traynor gave birth to strict liability in tort in Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the 
American Law Institute published the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965) in 
the following form: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1%5). The traditional fatal failure to furnish 
notice of breach of warranty which Justice Traynor avoided in Greenman would not be an 
issue under§ 402A. Privity, disclaimers and limitations of remedy provisions are similarly 
non issues under the strict liability in tort doctrine. 
3 See generally G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-316A and 2-318. § 2-316A which provides, in part, that 
both disclaiming and limiting the remedies of implied warranties by a seller or manufacturer 
under§ 2-314 (merchantability) and§ 2-315 (fitness for a particular purpose) are unenforce-
able in consumer transactions. Similarly, a manufacturer of consumer goods may not limit 
remedies with regard to an express warranty given by the manufacturer unless the manu-
facturer "maintains facilities within the [C]ommonwealth sufficient to provide reasonable 
and expeditious performance of the warranty obligations."§ 2-318 eliminates lack of privity 
as a defense in warranty and negligence cases and removes the failure to give notice of 
breach of warranty under § 2-607(3)(a) as a bar to an action in warranty unless the defendant 
is able to prove prejudice. 
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judicial pronouncements which have favorably compared Massachusetts 
warranty law to strict liability in tort are overstated and somewhat mis-
leading.4 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Mason, indicated 
that although it has consistently observed that warranty law is "congruent 
in nearly all respects" with strict liability in tort,5 special emphasis must 
now be placed on the "nearly" term. This emphasis results from one 
basic restriction imposed upon the expanding warranty theory of recov-
ery albeit inconsistent with the modern trend of opinions in other juris-
dictions relating to either warranty law or strict liability in tort. 
Specifically, the Court acknowledged the legislative abolition of privity 
as a defense to a non-purchasing plaintiff, but insisted that there be a 
contract of sale or lease as a prerequisite to a cause of action based on 
breach of warranty. 6 Troubled by the absence of the foregoing relation-
ships and unable to find a warranty arising from the chain of distribution 
in which the decedents could qualify as beneficiaries/ the previous claim 
of similarity between strict liability in tort and Massachusetts warranty 
law8 became tenuous and was rejected by the Court. 
In Mason, a father sought and received permission from the defendant 
automobile dealer to drive with his son in a demonstration Corvette. 
While driving in the allegedly defective vehicle, the father and son were 
involved in an accident and were fatally injured. According to the Court, 
the father and son were participants in a bailment and as a result their 
4 In Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984) the Court, quoting from 
Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 640, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978), observed that 
Massachusetts warranty law is "congruent in nearly all respects with the principles ex-
pressed in Restatement (Second) § 402A (1965)." Speaking about elimination of privity by 
§ 2-318, the Court in Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 630, 378 N.E.2d 61, 
63 (1978) noted that "[t]he result is to provide a remedy as comprehensive as that provided 
by § 402A of the Restatement .... " While it is clear that Massachusetts warranty law has 
been modified in the direction of§ 402A, a plaintiff under § 402A may still find himself in 
a superior position when compared to the limitations of warranty evidenced by the instant 
decision and the limitations of the Massachusetts legislative amendments under§§ 2-316A 
and 2-318. For example, the unenforceability of disclaimers and limitation of remedies 
under § 2-316A applies only to consumer transactions and the elimination of notice of 
breach is dependent on the defendant's failure to sustain the burden of proving prejudice. 
5 Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183, 189,480 N.E.2d 437,441 (1986)(quoting 
Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. at 640, 378 N.E.2d at 964). 
6 Mason, 397 Mass. at 187-88, 490 N.E.2d at 440. 
7 The Court indicated that had a warranty been given to anyone that the decedents could 
claim as beneficiary to under§ 2-318, the elimination of privity in Massachusetts would be 
relevant. Given that the decedent father apparently entered into a bailment relationship 
with the defendant dealer, if a warranty could be found to have resulted from that bailment 
relationship, the privity prerequisite would be satisfied without dwelling on the absence of 
a privity requirement in Massachusetts. 
8 See supra note 4. 
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representative was unable to avail herself of the warranty theory of 
recovery afforded to purchasers and lessees. Acknowledging that chapter 
106, section 2-318 dispensed with privity as a defense to a claim based 
on the implied warranty of merchantability, the Court held that the facts 
of Mason did not justify a cause of action where no warranty had been 
created in favor of the decedents, either directly or indirectly.9 According 
to the Court, the absence of an allegation that the Corvette was either 
sold or leased by the defendant dealer to the decedents or to someone 
from whom they could be considered beneficiaries, was sufficient grounds 
for awarding summary judgment in favor of the defendant dealer. 10 The 
Court concluded that an implied warranty may only arise as an appendage 
to a sales or lease transaction and not a bailment. 
The disintegration of privity as a litigation barrier was considered 
beneficial to plaintiffs only where an independently created warranty was 
breached and the Court was reluctant to imply warranty coverage in the 
instant bailment transaction on the basis of section 2-318. It was decided 
that this section of the Code only refers to the eradication of privity as 
a shield or defense and not as an offensive sword of warranty. The Court's 
analysis dissipated when it gratuitously rationalized the exclusion of 
bailment as a subject matter for warranty implication by explaining the 
reasoning behind the legislature's inclusion of lease transactions within 
the scope of warranty coverage. 
Section 2-318, already held inapplicable to bestow warranty protection 
to the decedents or their representatives in a bailment transaction, was, 
according to the Court, sufficient to include a lease transaction as a 
category eligible for warranty treatment. Section 2-318 provides that: 
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any 
action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier ... for 
breach of warranty . . . , althoUgh the plaintiff did not purchase the goods 
from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person whom· the manufacturer, 
seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably have expected to ... be affected 
by the goods. 11 
It is interesting that lessors are mentioned as potential target defendants 
under section 2-318 and that the result is that lessees are afforded war-
ranty protection under section 2-314, the implied warranty of merchant-
ability, even though no mention of lessor is made in that latter section. 12 
9 Two types of warranty claims exist. The first involves injuries to parties within the 
vertical chain of distribution. The other involves injuries to persorts connected to the 
horizontal chain enabling foreseeably injured, non-purchasing plaintiffs to benefit. 
10 397 Mass. at 189-90, 490 N.E.2d at 442. 
11 <lL. c. 106, § 2-318. 
12 G.L. c. 106, § 2-314. (l) Unless excluded or modified by section 2-316, a warranty that 
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a 
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That section 2-314 includes lease transactions is certainly not offensive 
to either the intended scope of Article 213 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code or to the spirit of coverage articulated in the Official Comments. 14 
What is dubious, however, is the selective treatment of inclusion fur-
nished to leases and the apparent retreating policy position of warranty 
coverage evidenced by the Court's exclusion of bailments. 
Extending warranty protection in Mason would appear to have been 
not only permissible, but correct. The previously quoted language of 
section 2-318 contains additional and potentially vulnerable categories of 
defendants, including a "supplier" who might reasonably expect the vic-
tims to be affected by the product in question. A bailor of goods would 
appear to fit within the "supplier" category. This statutory language 
suggests that the legislature's intent was to protect those involved in 
bailments as in the case of leases. As a result of the Mason opinion, we 
are witnessing an attenuating change in the Court's attitude toward con-
sumer protection under Massachusetts warranty law. 
Moreover, in addition to the desirable statutory consistency of adding 
bailment transactions to the scope of permissible warranty coverage, the 
policy of strict liability in tort, that cause of action which has been 
considered unnecessary in Massachusetts, would appear to cry out for 
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of 
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such foods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and 
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified by section 2-316, other implied warranties may arise 
from course of dealing or usage of trade. · 
13 G.L. c. 106, § 2-102 provides that "this Article applies to transactions in goods .... " 
The scope appears to be broad enough to encompass bailments. See generally, Back v. 
Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978), where the Court applied warranty 
law to leases. 
14 Official Comment 2 to Section 2-313 states: 
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made 
by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this 
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which 
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to 
the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circum-
stances such as in the case of bai1ments for hire, whether such a bailment is itself 
the main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the 
sale of their containers . . . . 
4
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coverage in this particular bailment situation. 15 In Mason, the defendant 
dealer apparently considered the father to be a potential buyer of a 
vehicle. 16 The demonstration vehicle was a marketing tool which may 
have been dangerously defective and causally connected to the fatal 
injuries suffered by the decedents. The demonstration vehicle was, in a 
sense, placed in the stream of commerce and accordingly, the policy of 
product responsibility should be broad enough to embrace all those who 
may be foreseeably injured as a result of this market-distribution process. 
There are distinct and important differences between the two major 
strict liability actions relating to products causing injuries: breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability in tort. These 
differences relate to the easing of plaintiffs' burdens in proceeding against 
the responsible product suppliers. Disclaimers, limitations of remedies, 
statutes of limitation problems, prerequisites of privity and notice re-
quirements which traditionally burden plaintiffs in warranty actions, are 
not relevant to the strict liability theory of recovery analysis. It was 
largely because of these warranty limitations that the doctrine of strict 
liability in tort was created. 17 
15 See generally, 30 Trial Lawyers of America Law Reporter, 196-98 (June 1987). These 
pages provide an insightful survey of those cases which have applied both warranty and 
strict tort liability to nonsales transactions. For example, the lead case discussed, Thorpe 
v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., found that the defendant manufacturer may be strictly liable 
for injuries incurred during a demonstration of product prior to sale. Thorpe v. Robert F. 
Bullock, 179 Ga. App. 867, 348 S.E.2d 55 (1986), aff'd, 256 Ga. 744, 353 S.E.2d 340 (1987). 
See also Davis v. Gibson Products Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (strict 
liability may be applicable to one injured while "trying out" a sheathed machete in the 
defendant's store); Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961) 
(Recovery was permitted in warranty where milk jug broke in plaintiff's hand without the 
necessity of proving the sale of the container). But note that several decisions were cited 
in Mason which have rejected warranty recovery to nonsale transactions. All such juris-
dictions, however, enjoy the availability of the less restrictive strict liability in tort theory 
of recovery. 
16 The Court accepted the defendant's response to interrogatories for purposes of resolv-
ing the motion for summary judgment, indicating that the father was considered a potential 
customer who was permitted to test drive the vehicle. 397 Mass. at 195, 490 N.E.2d at 445. 
17 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). Justice 
Traynor, in a concurring opinion, suggested the basis for a socially directed cause of action 
that bore fruit nineteen years later in his majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Escola, Justice 
Traynor argued that.those who possess superior tneans to prevent the marketing of defec-
tively dangerous products are best able to absorb the loss as a business cost. Thereafter, 
in Greenman, although Justice Traynor recognized that the injury causing power tool was 
negligently manufactured, his agenda extended to creating a more plaintiff-oriented cause 
of action. In rejecting the technical and troublesome notice prerequisite of the alternative 
claim of breach of warranty, Justice Traynor emphasized the strict liability character of 
warranty law and held that an injured consumer not in privity with the manufacturer should 
not be required to give notice of breach as a prerequisite to recovery. Finally, he noted 
5
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Because the Massachusetts legislature has amended Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code to substantially remove the traditional im-
pediments to warranty recovery, it is not difficult to understand why the 
belief that Massachusetts warranty law is "nearly" synonymous with 
strict liability in tort has been created. The narrow interpretation of who 
can sue and who can be sued, evidenced in Mason, however, highlights 
the significant difference between the two defective product actions. 
Strict liability in tort is a judicially created response to the determination 
that neither warranty law nor negligence as a theory of recovery has 
been consistently adequate to serve the interests of product purchasers 
and users in our economically oriented society. It may be some time 
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court makes the same deter-
mination.18 
§ 10.2. Admissibility of "State of the Art" as a Defense in Products 
Liability Actions. In Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 1 the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, applying Massachusetts law, upheld the admissibility 
of state of the art evidence in a warranty claim relating to the dangers of 
asbestos even though such evidence was considered "irrelevant" by an 
earlier Massachusetts decision, Hayes v. Ariens.2 The court in Anderson 
read Massachusetts law to "require a seller to warn only of reasonably 
foreseeable or scientifically discoverable dangers. "3 The earlier Hayes 
opinion explained that for the purpose of a warranty action, a warning 
must be given: 
by an ordinarily prudent vendor who ... is fully aware of the risks pre-
sented by the product. A defendant vendor is held to that standard regard-
less of the knowledge of risks that he actually had or reasonably should 
have had when the sale took place. The vendor is presumed to have been 
fully informed at the time of the sale of all risks. The state of the art is 
irrelevant .... Under Hayes, the duty to warn is triggered by the fact of 
danger and not by the knowledge or scienter of danger. 4 
Because the allegedly warnable dangers in Hayes were determined to 
be obvious by the circuit court in Anderson, the Hayes language refusing 
to exculpate the seller from a warning responsibility in a strict liability 
warranty action, even where the dangers were not reasonably knowable; 
that while strict liability had previously been based on warranty law, the harsh technical 
requirements of contract law should be eliminated in favor of a less burdened tort based 
theory of recovery. 
18 For a thoughtful analysis relating to the bailment warranty coverage issue, see Justice 
Liacos' dissent in Mason, 397 Mass. at 194-96, 490 N.E.2d at 444-45. 
§ 10.2. 1 799 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 
2 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984) 
3 Andersoll y. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986). 
4 391 Mass. at 413, 462 N.E.2d at 277 (emphasis in original). 
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was considered by the Anderson court to be dicta. In Hayes, the Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected the concept of culpability as an element of a strict 
liability warranty action and, accordingly, was unconcerned about what 
the defendant should have reasonably known about the danger. Instead, 
the Hayes Court indicated that the focus should be on whether a partic-
ular warning is adequate. 
The Anderson court, in contrast, referred to a more recently decided 
decision, MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,5 as support 
for its position that Massachusetts law has moved away from Hayes and 
toward the admissibility of state of the art evidence. In MacDonald, the 
Court remarked that the "duty is to provide ... reasonable notice of the 
nature, gravity and likelihood of known or knowable side effects. "6 While 
this may provide some support for a claim that Massachusetts now 
permits state of the art evidence in breach of warranty claims, two 
weaknesses are apparent. First, because the issue in MacDonald involved 
the adequacy of warning relating to known side effects from the ingestion 
of oral contraceptives, the Anderson court also should have read the 
language relating to the responsibility to warn of unknowable defects as 
dicta, as it did in Hayes. 7 If dicta is not available to substantiate the 
Massachusetts law rejecting state of the art evidence relating to warranty 
actions, as in Hayes, it should not be drawn upon to illustrate a so called 
changing position as it was in MacDonald. Second, MacDonald involved 
a combined action relating to both negligence and warranty and thus the 
"knowable" language may be attributable to the culpability aspect of the 
negligence portion and not to the warranty aspect of the claim. 
The Anderson decision neither adds to nor detracts from the current 
state of Massachusetts product liability law. Nevertheless, it does provide 
an important starting point to what may soon be a heated debate involving 
the availability of "the state of the art" as an acceptable defense in strict 
products liability actions. 
§ 10.3. "Duty to Warn" Applicable Where Product Itself Found Not 
Defective. In a negligence based warning case, Laaperi v. Sears Roebuck 
& Company, 1 a significant issue under consideration was whether the 
5 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985). 
6 Anderson, 799 F.2d at 4, quoting MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 
131, 139, 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1985). 
7 Note that Justice O'Connor, in Hayes, cited both Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. 
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); and Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 OL 
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), in support of rejecting the culpability issue in strict liability 
warning cases. Whether dicta or not, it appears that a seriously crafted message was 
communicated in Hayes. 391 Mass. at 413, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78. 
§ 10.3. 1 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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manufacturer and retail seller of a smoke detector powered by electric 
current had a duty to warn that the product may not operate in an 
electrical fire. The plaintiff argued that had he been warned of this danger, 
he would have purchased a battery-powered product instead. 
In its opinion, the court observed that liability may ensue even where 
the product is not defective in design or manufacture if the dangers 
associated with the product's foreseeable use should be communicated 
and are not. 2 Although there was no evidence of defect, the evidence 
was sufficient to infer that the failure to warn enhanced the harm caused 
by the fire. 3 In response to the defendant manufacturer's claim that the 
danger of an electrical fire incapacitating an electrical smoke detector 
was obvious and no duty to warn should be imposed, the court held that 
the "obvious" issue was one for jury determination and was not to be 
decided as a matter of law.4 
The court's treatment of the "obvious" issue is consistent with the 
modem trend of decisions. That the purchaser had some expertise re-
garding smoke detectors was not considered relevant. The warnings were 
measured according to the traditional "average user" or "reasonably 
prudent person" standard because the product was broadly marketed 
through catalogs and flyers. 
Although the Laaperi decision vacated the jury's verdict regarding 
damages, its affirmance of the district court's handling of the legal issues 
presented by these unique facts is sound. The First Circuit's opinion 
clearly reiterates the policy of imposing a "duty to warn" requirement 
on manufacturers who send their product into a marketplace of unwary 
consumers. The court attempted to balance society's need to warn these 
consumers with the appropriate imposition of liability commensurate with 
culpability. 
§ 10.4. Manufacturer's "Duty to Warn" Alleviated by Superseding Mis-
use of Product. In Mitchell v. Sky Climber, lnc., 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts refused to impose a duty to warn, based on 
negligence, on a supplier of a non-defective component lift motor which 
was improperly assembled into scaffolding equipment and ultimately 
caused the death of plaintiff's decedent. The defendant neither assembled 
2 /d. at 730. 
3Jd. 
4 /d. at 731-32. See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978), 
where the Court rejected the "inflexible rule that negligent design of an obviously dangerous 
product precludes finding a manufacturer or a designer liable." 
§ 10.4. 1 396 Mass. 629, 487 N.E.2d 1374 (1986). See generally Tate v. Robbins & 
Myers, Inc., 790 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1986), where a 1980 manual was sought to be admitted, 
in connection with a product manufactured in 1943 on duty to warn issue. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/13
§ 10.5 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 313 
nor designed the scaffolding rigging, but voluntarily distributed a manual 
which addressed the issues of "safety, rigging, operating, and mainte-
nance information." The manual, however, failed to provide a warning 
against cutting the insulation of electrical wiring. The decedent was killed 
by an electric shock arising from his contact with live wires exposed 
when their insulation was cut as a result of the improper rigging. 2 
The issue, in Mitchell, was whether a component part manufacturer 
who initially had no duty to warn created such a duty by voluntarily 
lecturing on the safe operation of the assembled product. According to 
the Court, while such duty may be created, the manufacturer, on these 
facts, had no duty to place "a warning of a possible risk created solely 
by the act of another that would not be associated with a foreseeable use 
or misuse of the manufacturer's own product. "3 
In another alleged negligent design guard decision, both the manufac-
turer and retailer were similarly absolved of responsibility for the plain-
tiff's injury.4 In West v. Sears Roebuck & Company, the United States 
Court of Appeals decided that the jury could have reasonably concluded 
that causation was not established where an allegedly defective lawn-
mower picked up a metal pipe which struck the plaintiff. That the plaintiff 
chose to use the mower in an area of "thick unmowed grass where 
unknown objects might lurk" was considered a sufficient showing of 
negligence on behalf of the plaintiff to interrupt the causal connection 
between a guard related defect and the plaintiff's injury.5 
§ 10.5. Warranty and Negligence Claims Are Distinct Causes of Actions 
in Massachusetts - Differing Results Allowed on Each Count. In Richard 
v. American Manufacturing Company, 1 the plaintiff crushed his hand 
when a press he was using was unexpectedly started by another em-
ployee. The evidence suggested that a "simple guard" could have reduced 
the risk "without undue cost or interference with the performance of the 
machinery." The Appeals Court affirmed the superior court's jury deter-
mination of negligent design. Because of the uncomplicated nature of the 
evidence relating to the defect, the court was unconcerned about the 
absence of expert testimony. 2 
2 Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 630, 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1375 (1986). 
3 Id. at 632, 487 N.E.2d at 1376. 
4 See West v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 780 F.2d 169 (lst Cir. 1986). 
5 ld. at 171. 
§ 10.5. 1 21 Mass. App. Ct. 967, 489 N.E.2d 214 (1986). 
2 Id. at %7, 489 N.E.2d at 215. See generally Coy v. Simpson Marine Safety Equipment, 
Inc., 787 F.2d 19 (lst Cir. 1986), where the court denied a motion for a judgment n.o.v. 
finding that the plaintiff's evidence, including expert opinion testimony, was adequate to 
find the motorcycle helmet in issue defective. 
9
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The defendant argued that because the plaintiff's action was brought 
in two counts, negligence and breach of warranty, the verdicts were 
inconsistent in that the jury found in favor of the defendant on the breach 
of warranty claims; but, nevertheless, in response to special questions, 
found the defendant seventy percent negligent. The Appeals Court af-
firmed the judgment noting that although the finding of negligence indi-
cates that there is also an existing breach of warranty, the defenses of 
the two actions are quite distinct. 3 
According to the court, the defense to breach of warranty is similar to 
the traditional assumption of risk defense because the plaintiff "may not 
recover if it is found that, after discovering the product's defect and being 
made aware of its danger, he nevertheless proceeded unreasonably to 
make use of the product and was injured by it. "4 According to the court, 
although the jury may have considered the plaintiff's actions to have 
been unreasonable in a breach of warranty sense, and possibly equivalent 
to contributory negligence in a negligence sense, the plaintiff was not 
disqualified from recovery in negligence unless his negligence was found 
to be greater than that of the defendant. Such was not the case in the 
instant action. 
As evident from the Appeals Court's holding in Richard, in Massachu-
setts it is clear that actions in warranty and actions in negligence are 
separate and distinct. As a result, it is possible for plaintiffs to win on 
one count and fail on the other. 
3 Richard v. American Mfg., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 967, 967, 489 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1986). In 
another recent decision, failure to wear a seat belt was not considered a defense to breach 
of warranty since the evidence failed to indicate that the decedent unreasonably proceeded 
to use the vehicle "which [she knew] to be defective and dangerous." MacCuish v. Volks-
wagenwerk A. G., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 494 N.E.2d 390 (1986). See generally, Hayes v. 
Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984). 
4 Richard, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 968, 489 N.E.2d at 215, quoting Correia v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 357, 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1041 (1983). See generally, 
Tringali v. Hathaway Machinery Co., Inc., 796 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1986). In Tringali, the 
United States Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's determination of negligence 
where the manufacturer failed to install a cover and safety brake for a port winch shaft 
installed on a vessel. Note the interesting discussion of various issues involved where 
defendant subsequently filed for bankruptcy. 
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